A protocol for computing a functionality is secure if an adversary in this protocol cannot cause more harm than in an ideal computation where parties give their inputs to a trusted party which returns the output of the functionality to all parties. In particular, in the ideal model such computation is fairall parties get the output. Cleve (STOC 1986) proved that, in general, fairness is not possible without an honest majority. To overcome this impossibility, Gordon and Katz (Eurocrypt 2010) suggested a relaxed definition -1/p-secure computation -which guarantees partial fairness. For two parties, they construct 1/p-secure protocols for functionalities for which the size of either their domain or their range is polynomial (in the security parameter). Gordon and Katz ask whether their results can be extended to multiparty protocols.
Introduction
Our protocols combine ideas from the protocols of Gordon and Katz [22] and our paper [4] , both of which generalize the protocol of Moran, Naor, and Segev [24] . Specifically, our protocols proceed in rounds, where in each round values are given to subsets of parties. There is a special round i ⋆ in the protocol. Prior to round i ⋆ , the values given to a subset of parties are values that can be computed from the inputs of the parties in this subset; staring from round i ⋆ the values are the "correct" output of the functionality. The values given to a subset are secret shared such that only if all parties in the subset cooperate they can reconstruct the value. If in some round many (corrupt) parties have aborted such that there is a majority of honest parties among the active parties, then the set of active parties reconstructs the value given to this set in the previous round. 1 Similar to the protocols of [24, 22, 4] , the adversary can cause harm (e.g., bias the output of the functionality) only if it guesses i ⋆ ; we show that in our protocols this probability is small and the protocols are 1/p-secure. The values in our protocols are chosen similar to [22] . The mechanism to secret share the values is similar to [4] , however, there are important differences in this sharing, as the sharing mechanism of [4] is not appropriate for 1/p-secure computations of functionalities which depend on inputs.
To complete the picture, we prove interesting impossibility results. We show that, in general, when the number of parties is super-constant, 1/p-secure protocols are not possible without honest majority when the size of the domain is polynomial. This impossibility result justifies the fact why in our protocols the number of parties is constant. We also show that, in general, when the number of parties is ω(log n), 1/p-secure protocols are not possible without honest majority even when the size of the domain is 2. The proof of the impossibility result is rather simple and follows from an impossibility result of [22] .
Our impossibility results should be contrasted with the coin-tossing protocol of [4] which is an efficient 1/p-secure protocol even when m(n), the number of parties, is polynomial in the security parameter and the number of bad parties is m(n)/2 + O(1). Our results show that these parameters are not possible for general 1/p-secure protocols even when the size of the domain of inputs is 2.
Open Problems. In both our impossibility results the size of the range is super-polynomial. It is open if there is an efficient 1/p-secure protocol when the number of parties is not constant and the size of both the domain and range is polynomial. In addition, the impossibility results do not rule out that the doubleexponential dependency on the number of parties can be improved.
The protocols of [22] are private -the adversary cannot learn any information on the inputs of the honest parties (other than the information that it can learn in the ideal world of computing F). The adversary can only bias the output. Our first protocol is not private (that is, the adversary can learn extra information). However, we do not know whether the second protocol is private. 2 It is open if there are general multiparty 1/p-secure protocols that are also private.
Preliminaries
A multi-party protocol with m parties is defined by m interactive probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines p 1 , . . . , p m . Each Turning machine, called party, has the security parameter 1 n as a joint input and a private input y j . The computation proceeds in rounds. In each round, the active parties broadcast and receive messages on a common broadcast channel. The number of rounds in the protocol is expressed as some function r(n) in the security parameter (typically, r(n) is bounded by a polynomial). At the end of the protocol, the (honest) parties should hold a common value w (which should be equal to an output of a predefined functionality).
In this work we consider a corrupt, static, computationally-bounded (i.e., non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time) adversary that is allowed to corrupt some subset of parties. That is, before the beginning of the protocol, the adversary corrupts a subset of the parties and may instruct them to deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary way. The adversary has complete access to the internal state of each of the corrupted parties and fully controls the messages that they send throughout the protocol. The honest parties follow the instructions of the protocol.
The parties communicate via a synchronous network, using only a broadcast channel. The adversary is rushing, that is, in each round the adversary hears the messages broadcast by the honest parties before broadcasting the messages of the corrupted parties for this round (thus, broadcast messages of the corrupted parties can depend on the broadcast messages of the honest parties in this round).
Notation. For an integer
An m-party functionality F = {f n } n∈N is a sequence of polynomial-time computable, randomized mappings f n : (X n ) m → Z n , where X n = {0, 1} ℓ d (n) and Z n = {0, 1} ℓr(n) are the domain of inputs of each party and the range respectively; ℓ d , ℓ r : N → N are some fixed functions. We denote the size of the domain and the range of F by d(n) and g(n) respectively, that is, d(n) = 2 ℓ d (n) and g(n) = 2 ℓr(n) . For a randomized mapping f n , the assignment w ← f n (x 1 , . . . , x m ) denotes the process of computing f n with the inputs x 1 , . . . , x m and with uniformly chosen random coins and assigning the output of the computation to w. If F is deterministic, we sometimes call it a function. We sometime omit n from functions of n (for example, we write d instead of d(n)).
The Real vs. Ideal Paradigm
The security of multiparty computation protocols is defined using the real vs. ideal paradigm. In this paradigm, we consider the real-world model, in which protocols are executed. We then formulate an ideal model for executing the task. This ideal model involves a trusted party whose functionality captures the security requirements from the task. Finally, we show that the real-world protocol "emulates" the ideal-world protocol: For any real-life adversary A there exists an ideal-model adversary S (called simulator) such that the global output of an execution of the protocol with A in the real-world model is distributed similarly to the global output of running S in the ideal model. In both models there are m parties p 1 , . . . , p m holding a common input 1 n and private inputs y 1 , . . . , y m respectively, where y j ∈ X n for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
The Real Model. Let Π be an m-party protocol computing F. Let A be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial time adversary that gets the input y j of each corrupted party p j and the auxiliary input aux. Let REAL Π,A(aux) ( y, 1 n ), where y = (y 1 , . . . , y m ), be the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary (i.e., the inputs of the corrupted parties and the messages it got) and the output of the honest parties following an execution of Π.
The Ideal Model. The basic ideal model we consider is a model without abort. Specifically, there is an adversary S which has corrupted a subset B of the parties. The adversary S has some auxiliary input aux. An ideal execution for the computing F proceeds as follows:
Send inputs to trusted party: The honest parties send their inputs to the trusted party. The corrupted parties may either send their received input, or send some other input of the same length (i.e., x j ∈ X n ) to the trusted party, or abort (by sending a special " abort j " message). Denote by x 1 , . . . , x m the inputs received by the trusted party. If p j does not send an input, then the trusted party selects x j ∈ X n with uniform distribution. 3
Trusted party sends outputs: The trusted party computes f n (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with uniformly random coins and sends the output to the parties.
Outputs:
The honest parties output the value sent by the trusted party, the corrupted parties output nothing, and S outputs any arbitrary (probabilistic polynomial-time computable) function of its view (its inputs, the output, and the auxiliary input aux).
Let IDEAL F ,S(aux) ( y, 1 n ) be the random variable consisting of the output of the adversary S in this ideal world execution and the output of the honest parties in the execution.
1/p-Indistinguishability and 1/p-Secure Computation
As explained in the introduction, some ideal functionalities for computing F cannot be implemented when there is no honest majority. We use 1/p-secure computation, defined by [22] , to capture the divergence from the ideal worlds. and all sufficiently large n it holds that µ(n) < 1/q(n). A distribution ensemble X = {X a,n } a∈Dn,n∈N is an infinite sequence of random variables indexed by a ∈ D n and n ∈ N, where D n is a domain that might depend on n. For a fixed function p(n), two distribution ensembles X = {X a,n } a∈Dn,n∈N and 
Two distribution ensembles are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X C ≡ Y , if for every c ∈ N they are computationally 1 n c -indistinguishable. We next define the notion of 1/p-secure computation [22] . The definition uses the standard real/ideal paradigm [15, 8] , except that we consider a completely fair ideal model (as typically considered in the setting of honest majority), and require only 1/p-indistinguishability rather than indistinguishability. 
We next define statistical distance between two random variables and the notion of perfect 1/p-secure computation, which implies the notion of 1/p-secure computation. 
Security with abort and cheat detection is defined in Appendix A. The cryptographic tools we use are described in Appendix B.
The Multiparty Secure Protocols
In this section we present our protocols. We start with a protocol that assumes that either the functionality is deterministic and the size of the domain is polynomial, or that the functionality is randomized and both the domain and range of the functionality are polynomial. We then present a modification of the protocol that is 1/p-secure for (possibly randomized) functionalities if the size of the range is polynomial (even if the size of the domain of F is not polynomial). The first protocol is more efficient for deterministic functionalities with polynomial-size domain. Furthermore, the first protocol has full correctness, while in the modified protocol, correctness is only guaranteed with probability 1 − 1/p.
Formally, we prove the following two theorems. 
, provided that r(n) is bounded by a polynomial in n. If F is deterministic, then there is a r(n)-round 1/p(n)-secure protocol for r(n) = p(n)·d(n) m·2 t , provided that r(n) is bounded by a polynomial in n.
Theorem 2 Let F = {f n : (X n ) m → Z n } be randomized functionality where the size of the range g(n) is polynomial in n and m is constant, and let p(n) be a polynomial. If enhanced trap-door permutations exist, then for t such that m/2 ≤ t < 2m/3 and for any polynomial p(n) there is an r(n)-round m-party 1/p(n)-secure protocol computing F tolerating up to t corrupt parties where
Following [24, 4] , we present the first protocol in two stages. We first describe in Section 3.1 a protocol with a dealer and then in Section 3.2 present a protocol without this dealer. The goal of presenting the protocol in two stages is to simplify the understanding of the protocol and to enable to prove the protocol in a modular way. In Section 3.3, we present a modification of the protocol which is 1/p-secure if the size of the range is polynomial (even if the size of the domain of f is not polynomial).
The Protocol for Polynomial-Size Domain with a Dealer
We consider a network with m parties where at most t of them are corrupt such that m/2 ≤ t ≤ 2m/3. In this section we assume that there is a special trusted on-line dealer, denoted T . This dealer interacts with the parties in rounds, sending messages on private channels. We assume that the dealer knows the set of corrupt parties. In Section 3.2, we show how to remove this dealer and construct a protocol without a dealer.
In our protocol the dealer sends in each round values to subsets of parties; the protocol proceeds with the normal execution as long as at least t + 1 of the parties are still active. If at some round i, there are at most t active parties, then the active parties reconstruct the value given to them in round i− 1, output this value, and halt. Following [24] , and its follow up works [22, 4] , the dealer chooses at random with uniform distribution a special round i ⋆ . Prior to this round the adversary gets no information and if the corrupt parties abort the execution prior to i ⋆ , then they cannot bias the output of the honest parties or cause any harm. After round i ⋆ , the output of the protocol is fixed, and, also in this case the adversary cannot affect the output of the honest parties. The adversary cause harm only if it guesses i ⋆ and this happens with small probability.
We next give a verbal description of the protocol. This protocol is designed such that the dealer can be removed from it in Section 3.2. A formal description is given in Figure 1 . At the beginning of the protocol each party sends its input y j to the dealer. The corrupted parties may send any values of their choice. Let x 1 , . . . , x m denote the inputs received by the dealer. If a corrupt party p j does not send its input, then the dealer sets x j to be a random value selected uniformly from X n . In a preprocessing phase, the dealer T selects uniformly at random a special round i ⋆ ∈ [r]. The dealer computes w ← f n (x 1 , . . . , x m ). Then, for every round 1 ≤ i < r and every J ⊆ {1, . . . , m} such that m − t ≤ |J| ≤ t, the dealer selects an output, denoted σ i J , as follows (this output is returned by the parties in Q J = {p j : j ∈ J} if the protocol terminates in round i + 1 and Q J is the set of the active parties):
Inputs: Each party p j holds a private input y j ∈ X n and the joint input: the security parameter 1 n , the number of rounds r = r(n), and a bound t on the number of corrupted parties.
Instructions for each honest party p j : (1) After receiving the " start " message, send input y j to the dealer. (2) If the premature termination step is executed with i = 1, then send its input y j to the dealer. (3) Upon receiving output z from the dealer, output z. (Honest parties do not send any other messages throughout the protocol.)
Instructions for the (trusted) dealer:
The preprocessing phase:
1. Set D 0 = ∅ and send a " start " message to all parties.
2. Receive an input, denoted x j , from each party p j . For every p j that sends an " abort j " message, notify all parties that party p j aborted, select x j ∈ X n with uniform distribution, and update D 0 = D 0 ∪ {j}.
. . , x m ) and select i ⋆ ∈ {1, . . . , r} with uniform distribution.
for each j ∈ J set x j = x j , for each j ∈ J select uniformly at random x j ∈ X n , and set
Interaction rounds: In each round 1 ≤ i ≤ r, interact with the parties in three phases:
• The peeking phase:
only corrupt parties, send the value σ i J to all parties in Q J .
• The abort phase: Upon receiving an " abort j " message from a party p j , notify all parties that party p j aborted (ignore all other types of messages) and update D = D ∪ {j}. If |D| ≥ m − t, go to premature termination step.
• The main phase: Send " proceed " to all parties.
Premature termination step:
• If i = 1, then: Receive an input, denoted x j ′ , from each active party p j . For every party p j that sends an " abort j " message, update D = D ∪ {j} and select x j ′ ∈ X n with uniform distribution. Set
• Else, if i > 1, then: For each " abort j " message received from a party p j , update
• Send w ′ to each party p j s.t. j / ∈ D 0 and halt.
Normal termination: If the last round of the protocol is completed, send w to to each party p j s.t. j / ∈ D 0 . The formal proof of the 1/p-security of the protocol appears in Appendix C. We next hint why for deterministic functionalities, any adversary can cause harm in the above protocol by at most
is the size of the domain of the inputs and the number of parties, i.e., m, is constant. As in the protocols of [24, 22, 4] , the adversary can only cause harm by causing the protocol to terminate in round i ⋆ . In our protocol, if in some round there are two values σ i J and σ i J ′ that the adversary can obtain such that σ i J = σ i J ′ , then the adversary can deduce that i < i ⋆ . Furthermore, the adversary might have some auxiliary information on the inputs of the honest parties, thus, the adversary might be able to deduce that a round is not i ⋆ even if all the values that it gets are equal. However, there are less than 2 t values that the adversary can obtain in each round (i.e., the values of subsets of the t corrupt parties of size at least m − t). We will show that for a round i such that i < i ⋆ , the probability that all these values are equal to a fixed value is 1/d O(1) for a deterministic function f n (for a randomized functionality this probability also depends on the size of the range). By [22, Lemma 2] , the protocol is d O(1) /r-secure.
Eliminating the Dealer of the Protocol
We eliminate the trusted on-line dealer in a few steps using a few layers of secret-sharing schemes. First, we change the on-line dealer, so that, in each round i, it shares the value σ i J of each subset Q J among the parties of Q J using a |J|-out-of-|J| secret-sharing scheme -called inner secret-sharing scheme. As in Protocol MPCWithD r described in Figure 1 , the adversary is able to obtain information on σ i J only if it controls all the parties in Q J . On the other hand, the honest parties can reconstruct σ i−1 J (without the dealer), where Q J is the set of active parties containing the honest parties. In the reconstruction, if an active (corrupt) party does not give its share, then it is removed from the set of active parties Q J . This is possible since in the case of a premature termination an honest majority among the active parties is guaranteed (as further explained below).
Next, we convert the on-line dealer to an off-line dealer. That is, we construct a protocol in which the dealer sends only one message to each party in an initialization stage; the parties interact in rounds using a broadcast channel (without the dealer) and in each round i each party learns its shares of the ith round inner secret-sharing schemes. In each round i, each party p j learns a share of σ i J in a |J|-out-of-|J| secret-sharing scheme, for every set Q J such that j ∈ J and m − t ≤ |J| ≤ t (that is, it learns the share of the inner scheme). For this purpose, the dealer computes, in a preprocessing phase, the appropriate shares for the inner secret-sharing scheme. For each round, the shares of each party p j are then shared in a 2-out-of-2 secret-sharing scheme, where p j gets one of the two shares (this share is a mask, enabling p j to privately reconstruct its shares of the appropriate σ i J although messages are sent on a broadcast channel). All other parties get shares in a t-out-of-(m − 1) Shamir secret-sharing scheme of the other share of the 2-out-of-2 secret-sharing. See Construction B.1 for a formal description. We call the resulting secret-sharing scheme the outer scheme.
To prevent corrupt parties from cheating, by say, sending false shares and causing reconstruction of wrong secrets, every message that a party should send during the execution of the protocol is signed in the preprocessing phase (together with the appropriate round number and with the party's index). In addition, the dealer sends a verification key to each of the parties. To conclude, the off-line dealer gives each party the signed shares for the outer secret sharing scheme together with the verification key. A formal description of the functionality of the off-line dealer, called Functionality MultiShareGen, is given in Figure 2 .
The protocol with the off-line dealer proceeds in rounds. In round i of the protocol all parties broadcast their (signed) shares in the outer (t + 1)-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme. Thereafter, each party can unmask the message it receives (with its share in the appropriate 2-out-of-2 secret-sharing scheme) to obtain its shares in the |J|-out-of-|J| inner secret-sharing of the values σ i J (for the appropriate sets Q J 's to which the party belongs). If a party stops broadcasting messages or broadcasts improperly signs messages, then all Joint input: The security parameter 1 n , the number of rounds in the protocol r = r(n), a bound t on the number of corrupted parties, and the set of indices of aborted parties D 0 .
Private input: Each party p j , where j / ∈ D 0 , has an input x j ∈ X n .
Computing default values and signing keys 1. For every j ∈ D 0 , select x j with uniform distribution from X n .
2. Select i ⋆ ∈ [r] with uniform distribution and compute w ← f n (x 1 , . . . , x m ).
Computing signed shares of the inner secret-sharing scheme 6. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , r} and for each 
Signing the messages of all parties 8. For every 1 ≤ q ≤ m, compute the message m q,i that p q ∈ P broadcasts in round i by concatenating (1) q, (2) i, and (3) the complement shares comp q (R
Outputs: Each party p j such that j / ∈ D 0 receives
• The verification key K ver .
• The messages M j,1 , . . . , M j,r that p j broadcasts during the protocol.
• p j 's private masks mask j (R other parties consider it as aborted. If m − t or more parties abort, the remaining parties reconstruct theInputs: Each party p j holds the private input y j ∈ X n and the joint input: the security parameter 1 n , the number of rounds in the protocol r = r(n), and a bound t on the number of corrupted parties.
Preliminary phase:
(a) The parties in {p j : j ∈ [m] \ D 0 } execute a secure-with-abort and cheat-detection protocol computing Functionality MultiShareGen r . Each honest party p j inputs y j as its input for the functionality.
(b) If a party p j aborts, that is, the output of the honest parties is " abort j ", then, set D 0 = D 0 ∪ {j}, chose x j uniformly at random from x j , and goto Step (2).
(c) Else (no party has aborted), denote D = D 0 and proceed to the first round.
3. Otherwise (|D 0 | ≥ m − t), the premature termination is executed with i = 1.
In each round i = 1, . . . , r do:
4. Each party p j broadcasts M j,i (containing its shares in the outer secret-sharing scheme).
5. For every p j s.t. Ver(M j,i , K ver ) = 0 or if p j broadcasts an invalid or no message, then all parties mark p j as inactive, i.e., set D = D ∪ {j}. If |D| ≥ m − t, premature termination is executed.
Premature termination step
6. If i = 1, the active parties use a multiparty secure protocol (with full security) to compute f n : Each honest party inputs y j and the input of each inactive party is chosen uniformly at random from X n . The active parties output the result, and halt. (c) The active parties output the output of this protocol, and halt.
At the end of round r:
8. Each active party p j broadcasts the signed shares R r,J j for each J such that j ∈ J.
9. Let J ⊆ [m] \ D be the lexicographical first set such that all the parties in Q J broadcast properly signed shares R r,J j . Each active party reconstructs the value σ r J , outputs σ r J , and halts. -with probability 1/(2p), select uniformly at random z i J ∈ Z n and set σ i J = z i J . -with the remaining probability 1 − 1/(2p),
1. For every j ∈ J select uniformly at random x j ∈ X n and for each j ∈ J, set
. . , x m ). Similarly, in the protocol without the dealer, Protocol MPC r , we replace Step (3) in MultiShareGen r (described in Figure 2) with the above step. Denote the resulting protocols with and without the dealer models by MPCWithDForRange and MPCForRange r , respectively.
The idea why this change improves the protocol is that now the probability that all values held by the adversary are equal prior to round i ⋆ is bigger, thus, the probability that the adversary guesses i ⋆ is smaller. This modification, however, can cause the honest parties to output a value that is not possible given their inputs, and, in general, we cannot simulate the case (which happens with probability 1/(2p)) when the output is chosen with uniform distribution from the range.
Impossibility of 1/p-secure Computation with Non-Constant Number of Parties
For deterministic functions, our protocol is efficient when the number of parties m is constant and the size of the domain or range is polynomial (in the security parameter n) or when the number of parties is O(log log n) and the size of the domain is constant. We next show that, in general, there is no efficient protocol when the number of parties is m(n) = ω(1) and the size of the domain is polynomial and when m(n) = ω(log n) and the size of the domain of each party is 2. This is done using the following impossibility result of Gordon and Katz [22] .
Theorem 3 ([22])
For every ℓ(n) = ω(log n), there exists a deterministic 2-party functionality F with domain and range {0, 1} ℓ(n) that cannot be 1/p-securely computed for p ≥ 2 + 1/ poly(n).
We next state and prove our impossibility results.
Theorem 4
For every m(n) = ω(log n), there exists a deterministic m(n)-party functionality F ′ with domain {0, 1} that cannot be 1/p-securely computed for p ≥ 2 + 1/ poly(n) without an honest majority.
Proof: Let ℓ(n) = m(n)/2 (for simplicity, assume m(n) is even). Let F = {f n } n∈N be the functionality guaranteed in Theorem 3 for ℓ(n). Define an m(n)-party deterministic functionality F ′ = {f ′ n } n∈N , where in f ′ n party p j gets the jth bit of the inputs of f n and the outputs of f n and f ′ n are equal Assume that F ′ can be 1/p-securely computed by a protocol Π ′ assuming that t(n) = m(n)/2 parties can be corrupted. This implies a 1/p-secure protocol Π for F with two parties, where the first party simulates the first t(n) parties in Π ′ and the second party simulates the last t(n) parties. The 1/p-security of Π is implied by the fact that any adversary A for the protocol Π can be transformed into an adversary A ′ for Π ′ controlling m(n)/2 = t(n) parties; as A ′ cannot violate the 1/p-security of Π ′ , the adversary A cannot violate the 1/p-security of Π.
Theorem 5
For every m(n) = ω(1), there exists a deterministic m(n)-party functionality F ′′ with domain {0, 1}
log n that cannot be 1/p-securely computed for p ≥ 2 + 1/ poly(n) without an honest majority.
Proof: Let ℓ(m) = 0.5m(n) log n and let F = {f n } n∈N be the functionality guaranteed in Theorem 3 for ℓ(m). We divide the 2ℓ(n) bits of the inputs of f n into m(n) blocks of length log n. Define an m(n)-party deterministic functionality F ′′ = {f ′′ n } n∈N , where in f ′′ n party p j gets the jth block of the inputs of f n and the outputs of f n and f ′′ n are equal. As in the proof of Theorem 4, a 1/p-secure protocol for F ′′ implies a 1/p-secure protocol for F contradicting Theorem 3.
The above impossibility results should be contrasted with the coin-tossing protocol of [4] which is an efficient 1/p-secure protocol even when m is polynomial in the security parameter and the number of bad parties is m(n)/2 + O(1). Notice that in both our impossibility results the size of the range is superpolynomial (as we consider the model where all parties get the same output). It is open if there is an efficient 1/p-secure protocol when the number of parties is not constant and the size of both the domain and range is polynomial.
A Security with Abort and Cheat Detection
We next present a definition of secure multiparty computation that is more stringent than standard definitions of secure computation with abort. This definition extends the definition for secure computation as given by Aumann and Lindell [1] . Roughly speaking, the definition requires that one of two events is possible: (1) The protocol terminates normally, and all parties receive their outputs, or (2) Corrupted parties deviate from the prescribed protocol; in this case the adversary obtains the outputs of the corrupted parties (but nothing else), and all honest parties are given an identity of one party that has aborted. The formal definition uses the real vs. ideal paradigm as discussed in Section 2.1. We next describe the appropriate ideal model. Send inputs to trusted party: The honest parties send their inputs to the trusted party. The corrupted parties may either send their received input, or send some other input of the same length (i.e., x j ∈ X n ) to the trusted party, or abort (by sending a special " abort j " message). Denote by x 1 , . . . , x m the inputs received by the trusted party. If the trusted party receives an " abort j " message, then it sends " abort j " to all honest parties and terminates (if it received " abort j " from more than one j, then it uses the minimal such j).
Trusted party sends outputs to adversary:
The trusted party computes w ← f n (x 1 , . . . , x m ) and sends the output w to the adversary.
Adversary instructs the trusted party to continue or halt:
A sends either a " continue " message or " abort j " to the trusted party for some corrupt party p j , i.e., j ∈ B. If it sends a " continue " message, the trusted party sends w to all honest parties. Otherwise, if the adversary sends " abort j ", then the trusted party sends " abort j " to all honest parties.
Outputs: An honest party always outputs the value w it obtained from the trusted party. The corrupted parties output nothing. The adversary A outputs any (probabilistic polynomial-time computable) function of the auxiliary input aux, the inputs of the corrupt parties, and the value w obtained from the trusted party.
We let IDEAL CD F ,S(aux) ( y, 1 n ) and REAL Π,A(aux) ( y, 1 n ) be defined as in Section 2.1 (where in this case IDEAL CD F ,S(aux) ( y, 1 n ) refers to the above execution with cheat-detection of F). This ideal model is different from that of [15] in that in the case of an "abort", the honest parties get output " abort j " and not a ⊥ symbol. This means that the honest parties know an identity of a corrupted party that causes the abort. This cheat-detection is achieved by most multiparty protocols, including that of [16] , but not all (e.g., the protocol of [18] does not meet this requirement). Using this notation we define secure computation with abort and cheat-detection. 
.
B Cryptographic Tools
Signature Schemes. Informally, a signature on a message proves that the message was created by its presumed sender, and its content was not altered. A signature scheme is a triple (Gen, Sign, Ver) containing the key generation algorithm Gen, which outputs a pair of keys, the signing key K S and the verification key K v , the signing algorithm Sign, and the verifying algorithm Ver. We assume that it is infeasible to produce signatures without holding the signing key. For formal definition see [15] .
Secret Sharing
Schemes. An α-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme is a mechanism for sharing data among a set of parties such that every set of size α can reconstruct the secret, while any smaller set knows nothing about the secret. In this paper, we use two schemes: the XOR-based m-out-of-m scheme (i.e., in this scheme α = m) and Shamir's α-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme [26] which is used when α < m. In both schemes, for every α − 1 parties, the shares of these parties are uniformly distributed and independent of the secret. Furthermore, given such α − 1 shares and a secret s, one can efficiently complete them to m shares of the secret s.
In our protocols we sometimes require that a single party learns the value of a secret that is shared among all parties. Since all messages are sent over a broadcast channel, we use two layers of secret sharing to obtain the above requirements as described below.
Construction B.1 (secret sharing with respect to a certain party) Let s be a secret taken from some finite field F. We share s among m parties with respect to a (special) party p j in an α-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme as follows:
1. Choose shares (s (1) , s (2) ) of the secret s in a two-out-of-two secret-sharing scheme (that is, select s (1) ∈ F uniformly at random and compute s (2) = s − s (1) ). Denote these shares by mask j (s) and comp(s), respectively.
Compute shares
Output:
• The share of party p j is mask j (s). We call this share "p j 's masking share".
• The share of each party p ℓ , where ℓ = j, is comp ℓ (s). We call this share "p ℓ 's complement share".
In the above scheme, we share the secret s among the parties in P in an α-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme where only sets of size α that contain p j can reconstruct the secret. In this construction, for every β < α parties, the shares of these parties are uniformly distributed and independent of the secret. Furthermore, given such β < α shares and a secret s, one can efficiently complete them to m shares of the secret s. In addition, given β shares and a secret s, one can efficiently select uniformly at random a vector of shares competing the β shares to m shares of s.
C Proof of 1/p-Security of the Protocols with a Dealer
In this section we prove that our protocols described in Section 3 that assume an trusted dealer are perfect 1/ poly-secure implementations of the ideal functionality F. We start by presenting in Appendix C.1 a simulator for Protocol MPCWithD r . In Appendix C.2, we prove the correctness of the simulation by showing the the global output in the ideal-world is distributed within 1/ poly statistical distance from the global output in the real-world. In Appendix C.3, we describe the required modifications to the simulator for the protocol for F that has a polynomial-size range, and argue that the modified simulation is correct.
C.1 The Simulator for Protocol MPCWithD r
We next present a simulator S T for Protocol MPCWithD r , described in Figure 1 . Let B be the set of indices of corrupted parties in the execution. The simulator S T invokes A on the set of inputs {y j : j ∈ B}, the security parameter 1 n , and the auxiliary input aux, playing the role of the trusted dealer in the interaction with A.
Simulating the preprocessing phase:
2. The simulator S T sends a " start " message to all corrupt parties. 3. S T receives a set of inputs {x j : j ∈ B} that A submits to the computation of the dealer. If
A does not submit an input on behalf of p j , i.e., A sends an " abort j " message, then, the simulator S T notifies all corrupted parties that party p j aborted and updates D 0 = D 0 ∪ {j}. 4. S T sets D = D 0 . If |D| ≥ m − t, the simulator sets i = 1 and proceeds to simulate the premature termination step. 5. S T selects i ⋆ ∈ {1, . . . , r} with uniform distribution. 6. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , i ⋆ − 1} and for each
. . , x m ). 7. The simulator S T sends " proceed " to all corrupt parties.
Simulating interaction rounds:
In each round 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the simulator S T interacts in three phases with the parties {p j : j ∈ B \ D 0 }, i.e., the corrupt parties which are active so far:
-If i = i ⋆ , the simulator S T sends the set of inputs {x j : j ∈ B \ D 0 } to the trusted party computing F and receives w S .
. . , i ⋆ − 1}, the simulator S T sends the value σ i J (prepared in the simulation of the preprocessing phase) to all parties in Q J (i.e., to the adversary). 2. Else, if i ∈ {i ⋆ , . . . , r}, S T sends the value w S to all parties in Q J (i.e., to the adversary).
• The abort phase: Upon receiving an " abort j " message from a party p j , 1. S T notifies all corrupted parties that party p j aborted. 2. S T updates D = D ∪ {j}. 3. If at least m − t parties have aborted so far, that is |D| > m − t, the simulator S T proceeds to simulate the premature termination step.
• The main phase: S T sends " proceed " to all corrupt parties.
Simulating the premature termination step:
• If the premature termination step occurred in round i = 1, -The simulator S T receives a set of inputs {x j ′ : j ∈ B \ D} that A submits to the computation of the dealer. If A does not submit an input on behalf of p j , i.e., sends an " abort j " message, then, the simulator S notifies all corrupted parties that party p j aborted and updates D = D ∪ {j}.
-The simulator S T sends the set of inputs {x j ′ : j ∈ B \ D} to the dealer and receives w S .
• If the premature termination step occurred in round 1 < i < i ⋆ , 1. Upon receiving an " abort j " message from a party p j , the simulator S T updates D = D ∪ {j}. 2. The simulator S T sends the set of inputs {x j : j ∈ B \ D} to the trusted party computing F and receives w S .
• (⋄ If the premature termination step occurred in round i ⋆ ≤ i ≤ r, then S T already has w S ⋄) • S T sends the value w S to each party in {p j : j ∈ B \ D 0 }.
Simulating normal termination:
If the last round of the protocol is completed, then S T sends w S to each party in {p j : j ∈ B \ D 0 }.
At the end of the interaction with A, the simulator will output the sequence of messages exchanged between the simulator and the corrupted parties.
C.2 Proof of the Correctness of the Simulation for MPCWithD r
In order to prove the correctness of the simulation described in Appendix C.1, we consider the two random variables from Section 2.1, both of the form (V, C), where V describes a possible view of A, and C describes a possible output of the honest parties (i.e., C ∈ Z n ). The first random variable REAL MPCWithDr,A(aux) ( y, 1 n ) describes the real world -an execution of Protocol MPCWithD, where V describes the view of the adversary A in this execution, and C is the output of the honest parties in this execution. The second random variable IDEAL F ,S T (aux) ( y, 1 n ) describes the ideal world -an execution with the trusted party computing F (this trusted party is denoted by T F ), where V describes the output of the simulator S T in this execution, and C is the output of the honest parties in this execution. For the rest of this section, we simplify notations and denote the above two random variables by REAL = (V REAL , C REAL ) and IDEAL = (V IDEAL , C IDEAL ) respectively.
We consider the probability of a given pair (v, c) according to the two different random variables. We compare the two following probabilities: (1) The probability that v is the view of the adversary A in an execution of Protocol MPCWithD r and c is the output of the honest parties in this execution, where the probability is taken over the random coins of the dealer T . (2) The probability that v is the output of the simulator S T in an ideal-world execution with the trusted party T F and c is the output of the honest parties in this execution, where the probability is taken over the random coins of the simulator S T and the random coins of the ideal-world trusted party T F .
In Lemma C.3 we prove the correctness of the simulation by showing that the two random variables are within statistical distance 1/ poly. For the proof of the lemma we need the following claim from [22] . MPCWithD r and let x 1 , . . . , x m be a set of inputs. Assume that for every possible output w obtained by the dealer using this set of inputs the probability that in a round i < i ⋆ all the values that the adversary sees are equal to w is at least α. Then, the probability that A guesses i ⋆ (i.e., causes premature termination in round i ⋆ ) is at most 1/αr.
Claim C.1 ([22, Lemma 2]) Let A be an adversary in Protocol
As the adversary might have some auxiliary information on the inputs of the honest parties and know the value of f n (x 1 , . . . , x m ), the adversary might be able to deduce that a round is not i ⋆ if not all the values that it gets are equal to this value (or a possible value for randomized functionalities). Specifically, in the worst case scenario, the adversary knows the inputs of all the honest parties. In the next claim we show a lower bound on the probability that all the values that the adversary obtains in a round i < i ⋆ of Protocol MPCWithD r are all equal to a fixed value.
Claim C.2 Let d(n) and g(n)
be the size of the domain and range, respectively, of a randomized functionality F computed by the protocol MPCWithD r . Let ǫ be a number such that Pr[f n (x 1 , . . . , x m ) = w ℓ ] ≥ ǫ for every set of inputs x 1 , . . . , x m and for each w ℓ from the range of f n (x 1 , . . . , x m ). Then, the probability that in a round i < i ⋆ all the values that the adversary sees are equal to a specific w is at least
Furthermore, if F is deterministic, then, this probability is at least
Lemma C.3 Let F be a (possibly randomized) functionality, A be a non-uniform polynomial-time adversary corrupting t < 2m/3 parties in an execution of Protocol MPCWithD, and S T be the simulator described in Appendix C.1 (where S T controls the same parties as A). Then, for every n ∈ N, for every y ∈ (X n ) m , and for every aux ∈ {0, 1}
It was explained in the proof of Claim C.2 that in each round of the protocol, A obtains less than 2 t values. Therefore, we conclude that he probability that all the values that A obtains in round i < i ⋆ are all equal to w is at least (1/(2p · g)) 2 t .
By applying the Claim C.1 we conclude that the probability of the adversary guessing i ⋆ correctly in Protocol MPCWithDForRange r is at most (2p · g) 2 t /r. In case of a premature termination in round i < i ⋆ , with probability 1 − 1/(2p) in both the ideal world and real world, the value that the honest parties output is the evaluation of f n on the inputs of the active parties and random inputs for the parties that aborted. However, with probability 1/(2p), if premature termination occurs prior to round i ⋆ , the output of the honest parties Protocol MPCWithDForRange r is a random value from the range of f n ; the simulator fails to simulate the execution in this case and outputs ⊥. Thus,
SD (IDEAL, REAL)
≤ Pr[Premature termination in round i ⋆ ] + (1/2p) · Pr[Premature termination before round i ⋆ ]
≤ (2p · g) 2 t /r + (1/2p).
Therefore, the statistical distance is as claimed.
D Proof of Security for the Protocols without the Dealer

D.1 The Simulator for Protocol MPC r
We next prove that Protocol MPC r is a secure real-world implementation of the (ideal) functionality of Protocol MPCWithD r . By Lemma C.3, when r(n) is sufficiently large, Protocol MPCWithD r is a 1/psecure protocol for F. Thus, together we get that Protocol MPC r is a 1/p-secure protocol for F. according to the definition appears in Appendix A. We analyze Protocol MPC r in a hybrid model where there are 3 ideal functionalities:
Functionality MultiShareGenWithAbort r . This functionality is an (ideal) execution of Functionality MultiShareGen r in the secure-with-abort and cheat-detection model. That is, the functionality gets a set of inputs. If the adversary sends " abort j " for some corrupt party p j , then this message is sent to the honest parties and the execution terminates. Otherwise, Functionality MultiShareGen r is executed. Then, the adversary gets the outputs of the corrupt parties. Next, the adversary decides whether to halt or to continue: If the adversary decides to continue, it sends a " proceed " message and the honest parties are given their outputs. Otherwise, the adversary sends " abort j " for some corrupt party p j , and this message is sent to the honest parties.
Functionality FairMPC. This functionality computes the value f n (x 1 , . . . , x m ). That is, the functionality gets a set of inputs. If a party p j sends " abort j " message then x j selected from X n with uniform distribution, computes an output of the randomized functionality f n for them, and gives it to all parties. When this functionality is executed, an honest majority is guaranteed, hence, the functionality can be implemented with full security (e.g., with fairness).
Functionality Reconstruction. This functionality is described in Figure 4 ; this functionality is used in the premature termination step in Protocol MPC r for reconstructing the output value from the shares of the previous round. When this functionality is executed, an honest majority is guaranteed, hence, the functionality can be implemented with full security (e.g., with fairness). 
